The purpose of this paper is to show that inflation targeting is compatible with Post Keynesian economics, but only if the policies used to achieve the inflation target explicitly acknowledge (a) the demand-determined nature of the real income generating process, and (b) the importance of conflicting claims over the distribution of income for determining the rate of inflation. The paper then questions whether or not policy makers should trouble to engage in inflation targeting. It is shown that there does exist a Post Keynesian case for inflation targeting, but that the appropriate inflation target that emerges from Post Keynesian economics suggests that far too much attention is currently being paid to inflation and that more of policy makers' attention should be devoted to output (and, by extension, employment) targeting.
Introduction
Broadly defined, inflation targeting involves the public announcement of inflation targets coupled with a credible and accountable commitment on the part of government policy authorities to the achievement of these targets. Advocates of inflation targeting typically prescribe the appropriate target rate of inflation as involving "price stability", although they disagree as to the precise meaning of this term. For authors such as Feldstein (1997) , price stability involves a long-run inflation rate of zero, whereas Mishkin (2001) argues against a target of zero inflation on the grounds that it invites financial instability and pronounced contractions in the real economy resulting from periods of deflation. Hence Mishkin (2002, p.361) cites approvingly Alan Greenspan's definition of price stability as a "rate of inflation that is sufficiently low for households and businesses not to have to take it into account in making everyday decisions", and suggests that, in practice, any rate of inflation between zero and 3 per cent would satisfy this definition.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether or not Post Keynesian economics is compatible with the idea of inflation targeting as defined above.
1 The answer developed in what follows is that Post Keynesianism is compatible with inflation targeting, but only if there is explicit recognition in the design of the policies used to pursue an inflation target of both (a) the role of aggregate demand in determining real income and (b) the importance of conflicting 1 It should be noted at this point that there are more stringent definitions of inflation targeting than that offered above. For example, one of the five main elements of inflation targeting identified by Mishkin is "an institutional commitment [on the part of the central bank] to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, to which other goals are subordinated" (Mishkin 2002, p.361, emphasis added) . If a definition of this nature is adopted, then Post Keynesian economics is incompatible with inflation targeting by definition: as will become clear in what follows, the Post Keynesian tradition offers no support for either the automatic elevation of price stability (however defined) to the status of "primary goal" of monetary policy, or the subordination of all other policy goals to an inflation target. For the purposes of this paper, however --and precisely in order to avoid the rather facile posture of choosing a definition of inflation targeting designed to render the answer to the question in the title of the paper negative by definition -we will proceed on the basis of the broader definition of inflation targeting stated earlier.
claims over the distribution of nominal income in the inflation process. 2 It is also argued that the sort of inflation target consistent with the strictures of Post Keynesian economics suggests that the prescription of a zero to 3 per cent inflation target places too much emphasis on low inflation as a policy goal, and that more attention should be devoted to the development and pursuit of output (and, by extension, employment) targets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly examines the case for inflation targeting in mainstream macroeconomics. Section 3 then examines whether or not inflation targeting is compatible with Post Keynesian economics, demonstrating that a reconciliation between Post Keynesianism and inflation targeting is possible as long as policy making is sensitive to the intrinsic natures of the income-generating and inflation processes as conceived by Post Keynesian macro theory. The question as to whether or not inflation targeting is worthwhile is taken up in section 4. Finally, section 5 offers some conclusions.
Inflation targeting: the mainstream view
The compatibility of inflation targeting with mainstream macroeconomics is easily illustrated in the context of the neo-Wicksellian or "new consensus" model (see, inter alia, Romer 2000; Woodford 2003) . This model, which is understood by its proponents to be representative of the policy models used by many major central banks (Taylor 2000, p.91), retains four interrelated features of pre-Keynesian economics that are characteristic of modern mainstream macroeconomics more generally: real wage bargaining, the neutrality of money, 2 The thesis of compatibility between Post Keynesian economics and inflation targeting advanced in this paper is therefore substantively different from the nominal identical thesis advanced by Palley (forthcoming), whose argument rests on a particular (and rather idiosyncratic) specification of the Phillips curve. As will become clear in what follows, no special claims are made about the shape of the Phillips curve in this paper, beyond its addressing the conventional and time-worn issue as to whether or not the Phillips curve should depict a long run relationship between inflation and real economic outcomes.
supply-determined equilibrium (the notion that aggregate demand is irrelevant for determining the equilibrium values of real variables) and demand-pull inflation (the notion that excess aggregate demand is the ultimate source of all inflation). 3 These three features are summarized in the form assumed by the Phillips curve in the new consensus, which is consistent with the natural rate hypothesis.
4
The new consensus model can be summarized by the following system of equations:
where y and y n denote real output and the "natural" level of real output, respectively, r is the real interest rate, and p and p T are the actual and target rates of inflation, respectively. 
whilst using the second, we can re-write [5] as:
The equilibrium configuration of the dynamical system in equations 
Note that a third equilibrium value can be obtained by referring back to the structural model in Inspection of the Jacobian matrix in [8] reveals that │J│= δγα > 0 and Tr(J) = -δβ < 0: hence the equilibrium configuration derived above is stable. The substance of these results is that in the new consensus model, not only do the policy authorities (specifically, the central bank) set an explicit inflation target, but by acting in accordance with equation [3] , they ensure that this inflation target is part of an aggregate equilibrium configuration towards which the economy will return following any disturbance. Moreover, since the inflation target does not enter into the equilibrium solution of y, it follows that the policy authorities can set any inflation target they desire without this having any effect on the real equilibrium of the economy. This is illustrated in Figure 1 below, which is based on the isoclines in equations [6] and [7] . What Figure 1 shows is that as the policy authorities vary their inflation target (in this case, lowering it from 1
the equilibrium level of real output y * = y n is unaffected; only the equilibrium rate of inflation changes, falling in line with the reduction in the inflation target itself. In this sense, the new consensus model describes an economy that is fully compatible with inflation targeting: not only does the structure of the model give rise to conditions under which an established inflation target can be achieved, it also suggests that inflation targeting can be given "free rein" as an autonomous policy objective, since the precise inflation target that is set and pursued by the policy authorities has no bearing on the real equilibrium configuration of the economy.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Is inflation targeting compatible with Post Keynesian economics? i) A baseline Post Keynesian model with an inflation-targeting central bank
If the hallmark of mainstream macroeconomics is its embodiment of the essentially classical precepts of real wage bargaining, the neutrality of money, supply-determined equilibrium and demand-pull inflation as encapsulated in a Phillips curve consistent with the natural rate hypothesis, then it is a relatively simple matter to amend a mainstream macro model in order to make it more consistent with Post Keynesian economics. Specifically, one need only make changes to the form of the Phillips curve in order to develop a model that is consistent with four interrelated and essential tenets of Post Keynesian economics: nominal wage bargaining, the non-neutrality of money, demand-determined equilibrium (the notion that aggregate demand 
Inspection of the Jacobian matrix in [14] reveals that │J│= 0 and Tr(J) = -δγ/(1 -φ) < 0: the equilibrium configuration of the baseline Post Keynesian model is stable. What these results mean is that in the baseline Post Keynesian model (as in the new consensus model), not only do the policy authorities (specifically, the central bank) set an explicit inflation target, but by acting in accordance with equation [11] , they ensure that this inflation target is part of an aggregate equilibrium configuration towards which the economy will return following any disturbance.
However, since the inflation target does now enter into the equilibrium solution of y, any inflation target set by the policy authorities will inevitably affect on the real equilibrium of the economy. This is illustrated in Figure 2 below, which is based on the isoclines in equation [13] . and engage in a policy of inflation targeting by explicitly acknowledging the "conflicting claims" basis of the inflation process and thus seeking to manipulate the ability and/or willingness of workers to seek increased nominal wage growth (which is assumed to be motivated, at least in part, by a desire to influence the functional distribution of income).
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In order to demonstrate the impact of this change in the behaviour of the policy authorities, we begin once again by reducing the structural model above to a system of two simultaneous differential equations. It may appear that the model described above "blames workers" for inflation. In fact, this is not the case. Nominal wage growth designed to influence the distribution of income will only prove inflationary if firms are willing and able to resist income redistribution by passing on nominal wage increases in the form of higher prices. Inflation thus results from the irreconcilable claims of workers and firms on nominal income, not from the behaviour of workers alone. As such, policies that act on Z in an effort to reduce inflation may, in fact, be directed in the first instance at firm behaviour rather than that of workers, in an effort to better reconcile the competing claims of workers and firms on nominal income and thus reduce the workers' desire for nominal wage increases.
inflation targets set by the policy authorities. 11 Moreover, this equilibrium configuration is stable. 
Examination of the Jacobian in [21] These results demonstrate that in the extended Post Keynesian model, as in the baseline Post Keynesian model, it is possible for the policy authorities to both set an explicit inflation target and to execute policy so as to ensure this inflation target is part of an aggregate equilibrium configuration to which the economy will return following any disturbance. This time, however, the equilibrium solution of y is once again independent of the authorities' inflation target. This is clearly illustrated in Figure 3 Figure 1 , then, the extended Post Keynesian model describes an economy that is fully compatible with inflation targeting: not only does the structure of this model give rise to conditions under which an established inflation target can be achieved, it also suggests that inflation targeting can be given "free rein" as an 11 In this respect, the extended Post Keynesian model outlined above avoids the problem identified by Setterfield (2004) , according to whom Post Keynesian models in which the policy authorities attempt to set both output and inflation targets may involve the authorities missing both of their targets, unless they explicitly take into account the long run, direct relationship between output and inflation identified in the previous sub-section in the initial formulation of their targets. This is for the simple reason that the model developed above contains as many policy instruments as targets, whereas the model formulated in Setterfield (2004) does not.
autonomous policy objective, since the precise inflation target that is set and pursued by the policy authorities has no bearing on the real equilibrium configuration of the economy. 12 The main difference in macroeconomic outcomes as between the extended Post Keynesian and new consensus models is, of course, that in the former, the real equilibrium configuration of the economy involves a level of output (and, by extension, employment) that is an explicit creation of the policy authorities (the target level of output y T ) and that does not correspond to any unique, supply-determined equilibrium determined independently of policy.
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As intimated earlier, the essential difference in outcomes between the baseline and extended Post Keynesian models is explained by the fact that the former embodies policy authorities that are committed only to inflation targeting and that are inclined to treat inflation as if it were an exclusively demand-pull phenomenon, whereas the latter involves policy making that explicitly recognizes both the importance of aggregate demand conditions for real economic activity and the "conflicting claims" basis of the inflation process. Hence the policy reaction functions in [15] and [16] seek to manipulate aggregate demand in the pursuit of an output target whilst simultaneously engaging in a policy of inflation targeting by manipulating the ability and/or willingness of workers to seek increases in nominal wage growth motivated by distributional concerns. Note that in the simple model developed above, the question as to exactly what the manipulation of Z involves -i.e., exactly how the distributional concerns of workers are addressed in order to bring inflation under control -is not explicitly addressed. It is possible that Z might be raised by reducing the willingness of workers to press for higher 12 See the discussion immediately below for an important potential qualification to this conclusion. 13 See, for example, Smithin (2004) for the argument that constructs such as y n in mainstream macroeconomics are no more than implicit creations of the policy authorities, dressed in the language of "naturalism" to masquerade as objective, given conditions over which the authorities themselves have no control when it comes to establishing the course of appropriate macroeconomic policy interventions.
nominal wage growth, by developing a mutually consensual commitment on the part of both workers and firms to a particular distribution of income in the context of a "social bargain" (Cornwall 1990; Cornwall and Cornwall 2001) . On the other hand, Z might be raised by reducing the ability of workers to press for higher nominal wage growth (whatever their discontent with the current distribution of income) by creating an "incomes policy based on fear", in which structural features of the labour market (including changes in labour law, employment practices such as periodic downsizing and credible threats to relocate production) are used to coerce workers into de facto acceptance of firms' preferred functional distribution of income (Setterfield 2005) . These considerations call attention to the fact that in the extended Post Keynesian model 
Is inflation targeting worthwhile?
Having demonstrated the potential compatibility of inflation targeting with Post
Keynesian economics, an important final question remains: is inflation targeting worthwhile?
The claim of both the new consensus and extended Post Keynesian models developed above that inflation targeting can be given a "free rein" as an autonomous policy objective is based on the independence of the real equilibrium configuration of the economy from the policy authorities'
inflation target in either of these models: inflation targeting is apparently a "free lunch", in the sense that inflation can be lowered without this having any (permanent) adverse effect on output and employment.
But if the real economy is independent of the rate of inflation, why bother with inflation targeting in the first place? Setting aside the equity issues associated with the adverse impact of inflation on those with fixed nominal incomes, mainstream macroeconomists claim to have identified a number of reasons for devoting policy to the pursuit of low inflation. First, it is argued that inflation is not, in fact, neutral with respect to the real economy, but is, instead, inimical to employment and/or growth (Friedman 1970; Jarrett and Selody 1982; Davis 1991) .
However, some of the empirical results associated with this claim have proved difficult to replicate empirically, whilst others depend crucially on observations drawn from high inflation environments, where the observed rate of inflation exceeds 15 or even 20 per cent (Setterfield and MacLean 1991; MacLean and Setterfield 1993) .
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A second argument calls attention to problems that arise from the non-indexation of tax brackets, which can distort the tax burden when nominal incomes rise purely as a result of inflation. But an important question here is whether it is really the proper role of macroeconomic policy to solve a problem that is ultimately due to the administration of the tax code? Finally, there are the fabled "shoe leather" costs of inflation -welfare losses arising from the inconvenience of dealing with ever larger nominal magnitudes in a money-using economy.
Shiller (1997) reports that inflation is unambiguously unpopular with the general public, and empirical results suggest that the welfare losses resulting from the impact of inflation on the demand for money that are associated with a 10% rate of inflation are somewhere in the order of 0.3 -0.45 per cent of national income (Fischer 1981; Lucas 1981 It should also be noted that connecting inflation to employment and/or growth poses a theoretical challenge for mainstream macroeconomics, since logically, it is impossible to sustain the claim that money is neutral in the long run whilst simultaneously asserting that inflation -an intrinsically nominal phenomenon -has real effects. If there is, in fact, no Classical dichotomy, it behoves the mainstream to explore the full implications of this and incorporate it consistently into macroeconomic models.
beneficial for the real economy. Hence mild inflation ensures that the economy will avoid the potentially serious (for both the financial sector and the real economy) travails of deflation. It also "oils the wheels" of commerce, facilitating labour market adjustment and making it easier for firms (who must always purchase inputs at today's prices, before they can produce and the ultimately sell output at tomorrow's prices) to commit to productive activity (Palley 1996, p.83) . 16 However, it would be consistent with Post Keynesian monetary theory to suggest that if a sufficiently high rate of inflation can disrupt the fundamental conventions of the use of money as a unit of account, store of value, and means of finance, the result would be severe dislocation of the real economy -as, for example, in hyper-inflating economies, which typically suffer both hyper-inflation and low growth/high unemployment. But as with mainstream arguments concerning the costliness of inflation, what this essentially points to is the notion of a non-linear relationship between inflation and real outcomes, according to which it is rates of inflation above some relatively high threshold level that are detrimental and can be considered an appropriate focus of remedial macroeconomic policy intervention.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a comprehensive survey of the costs of inflation. But what the brief discussion above does suggest is that both mainstream and Post
Keynesian economics can only really justify concern with high inflation, by which we certainly mean inflation rates well in excess of the 3 per cent recommended by Mishkin (2002) as the upper limit of the acceptable range of inflation targets. What this suggests is that too much emphasis is currently placed on inflation targeting as a policy objective. This conclusion seems particularly appropriate in the context of the extended Post Keynesian model developed in the previous section, in which target values that are explicit creations of the policy authorities (and that have no real or imagined basis in any "natural" values intrinsic to the economy) are instrumental in the determination of both the equilibrium rate of inflation and the equilibrium level of real output. Bearing this in mind, and in view of the conclusions reached on the basis of the brief review of the costs of inflation above, it seems that one of the most important lessons to be drawn from the extended Post Keynesian model is that, regardless of the fact that inflation targeting can be rendered fully compatible with Post Keynesian economics, there is currently too much emphasis on achieving low inflation and very much too little emphasis on the importance of and role of macroeconomic policy in determining the levels of real output and employment.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to explore the potential compatibility of inflation targeting and Post Keynesian economics. It has been shown that inflation targeting is fully compatible with mainstream macroeconomics (as exemplified by the new consensus), in the sense that it is possible in a mainstream model for the policy authorities to both set and achieve an inflation target, and to pursue inflation targeting as an autonomous policy objective (by virtue of the independence of the real economy from the authorities' inflation target). It was then shown that a baseline Post Keynesian model can be developed utilizing the basic structure of the mainstream model, simply by altering the form of the Phillips curve. The resulting model is, however, only partially compatible with inflation targeting: an inflation target can be set and achieved, but inflation targeting cannot be pursued autonomously by virtue of the influence of the inflation target on the equilibrium level of real economic activity. Finally, an extended Post Keynesian model was developed in which the policy authorities explicitly acknowledge both the
